The type of information sent and how it is
sent affect an enemy's ability to exploit friendly communications. Reducing
transmissions is the key to transmission security.
duration to 15 seconds when possible.
Enemy analyst can exploit unneeded
communications problems, and unit morale.
This deals with codes, keylists, and COMSEC
a. Using a security device denies enemy linguists the ability to
exploit message texts.
However, enemy EW units can still locate the
transmitter. They can associate the location and net structure to the type
unit, mission, and intentions.
b. When an enemy cannot gain information from a radio station, he may
try to jam or destroy it.
c. Codes and keylists should always be those included in the SOI.
Homemade codes offer no challenge to an experienced cryptoanalyst. However,
they do offer an excellent source of information.
They also provide
operators with a false sense of security.
By talking around a
subject and using unauthorized nicknames, enemy analysts receive excellent
opportunities to gain EEFI.
Common sense measures and adherence to unit
operational policies are the keys to good physical security practices.
These include protection of SOI materials and keylists.
PART D - SUMMARY
a. The two major areas of
(1) Most military radios have unique design features incorporated
(a) Null steering
effects of jamming.
(b) The spread spectrum technique suppresses interference by other
It provides multiple access (user
sharing) and ends multipath interference (self jamming).