(2) The Chinese used radio silence during their move into Korea
in 1950.
Thus, the UN forces were denied data on the location and
intentions of the Chinese.
d. Vietnam. Both sides used EW in Vietnam. ELSEC and deception
became an integral part of U.S.
battle planning.
For the first
time, EW units directly supported units at the brigade and separate
regiment level.
(1) In North Vietnam, Chinese and Vietnamese air defense units
caused the U.S. to use EW to protect its aircraft from radar-
controlled; surface-to-air missile.
(2) In South Vietnam, both the U.S. Army and the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) used EW support measures (ESM) to aid
their ground forces.
Captured enemy documents showed that the Viet
Cong and the North Vietnamese Army were both very involved in
collecting U.S. and ARVN communications.
(3) Vietnam also saw the first large-scale use of airborne
platforms to collect enemy communications and locate enemy units.
However, jamming was not a major factor in this war.
e. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
The Persian Gulf War
provides an example of battlefield deception.
The undetected
positioning of the coalition forces showed how an effective use of
radio silence and deception can influence a battle's outcome. Modern
EW technology was also used to seek out major communications
facilities, determine their use, and provide targeting information
for their destruction.
(1) ELINT was heavily used to locate and destroy the Iraqi air
defense capability.
U.S. Air Force systems suppressed radar sites.
The coalition forces used jamming and lethal attacks with high-speed,
anti-radiation missiles.
(2) The coalition forces used ESM to support the planning of
deception operations. The U.S. Marine Corps portrayed an amphibious
assault on Kuwait from the sea.
EW was used to support rehearsed
landings and to monitor the Iraqi forces' reaction (determining unit
locations and monitoring radio traffic) to the deception.
SS0134
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