(b) Relocate the antenna frequently.
This makes the timely
locating and targeting of stations more difficult. When you cannot move an
antenna, remote it as far as possible from the radio.
(c) Use directional antennas when possible.
or unidirectional antennas is preferred over omni-directional antennas.
(d) Use low power settings when possible.
Higher power levels
increase a signals range, making it easier for an enemy to locate the
(e) Select the correct antenna to support the operating nets power
(2) Radio operator procedures are the key to the success of
preventive ECCM techniques.
Using correct procedures reduces an enemy's
usable data an enemy intercepts is lessened by:
Enemy sign analysts can identify operators and stations that
use unique or otherwise distinctive phrases or procedures.
Call sign and
frequency changes are useless when an operator compromises his station's
identification by violating procedures after changes occur.
operator-distinguishing procedures often develop through operator design
(unique method of opening a net). Others occur with a gradual development
of a habitual approach or technique.
(b) Operating on a
random schedule. Set operating schedules make
the jobs of enemy operators
and analysts easier. Using fixed schedules for
radio checks or for sending
reports provides a handy method of station and
net identification for enemy
(c) Using authentication. A constant threat is the chance that an
enemy may intrude into a radio net. The most effective means of countering
deceptive entry is authentication. Authentication procedures are found in
(d) Encrypting essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
EEFI encompass the tactical situation, enemy contact, and operations orders.
They include operations plans, equipment status reports, and personnel
(COMSEC) devices authorized for the classification level of the material
being sent. A listing of the material types to be encrypted is in the SOI's
the effects of jamming. It also provides an improved signal-to-noise ratio.