3.
Electronic Deception.
This is normally used to cause enemy
analysts to misread the situation and provide their commander with
misleading information and intelligence that appears to be accurate.
The three types of electronic deception are manipulative electronic
deception (MED), simulative electronic deception (SED), and imitative
electronic deception (IED).
The signal officer plans and executes
both MED and SED.
IED is primarily conducted by military
intelligence (MI) personnel.
a. MED involves altering the electromagnetic profile of friendly
forces.
(1) MED tries to influence or alter enemy EW and SIGINT
estimates of the situation.
It does this by changing the technical
characteristics of specified friendly communications to create false
impressions.
(2) MED can include false traffic levels, false peaks, routing,
electronic cover, and controlled breaches of communications security.
It can also use non-communications devices.
(3) The deployment of various types of radar to mislead
analytic assessments of the location of airfields, air defense
batteries, and field artillery units can aid in applying MED
effectively.
(4) To be effective, MED must be developed by those with a
complete knowledge of the operational concepts and procedures of
friendly communications.
b. SED can counter an enemy's EW ability to accurately read the
battlefield.
It does this by misleading the enemy about friendly
force composition, deployment, and capabilities.
(1) The indication of additional friendly forces on or
approaching the battlefield is an example of SED.
By matching the
communications and non-communications emitters of a friendly unit and
duplicating the type and volume of radio traffic normally found in
that unit, an enemy can be misled into believing there are more
friendly forces on the battlefield than actually exist.
(2) The introduction of new or different electronic systems can
indicate to an enemy that new systems or type units are available.
3-5
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