(3) Another method of conducting SED is to create a false
electronic signature which indicates that a friendly unit has moved.
Such deception, coupled with suppressed communications at the unit's
actual location, can alter an
enemy's estimate of friendly
intentions.
c. IED can be conducted
against
both
communications
and
non-
communications emitters.
(1) The function of IED may vary in the methods and techniques
used. IED injects false and misleading information directly into an
enemy's communications nets.
Thus, the activity may vary in scope,
based on the sensitivity and sophistication of the techniques used.
(2) The scope of IED may include nuisance intrusion, deceptive
jamming, planned message intrusion, and cryptographic intrusion.
Nuisance intrusion requires language ability, a compatible radio, and
little technical support.
However, deceptive jamming, planned
message intrusion, and cryptographic intrusion need skilled operators
to prevent the enemy from detecting the level of success that
friendly EW and SIGINT are having in exploiting enemy communications.
d. The use of electronic, physical, and sonic (noise) deception
techniques is depicted in Figure 3-1.
The main attacking force of
tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC) uses radio silence and
noise discipline. A small deception portrays a large frontal attack.
The two APCs have a small physical signature.
Loudspeakers and
equipment broadcast recorded tank and APC noise.
With that and the
tree line to hide in, the two APCs indicate a larger force.
Thus,
the enemy is fed false data.
SS0134
3-6
Previous Page
