3.
The type of information sent and how it is
sent affect an enemy's ability to exploit friendly communications. Reducing
transmissions is the key to transmission security.
Keep transmission
duration to 15 seconds when possible.
Enemy analyst can exploit unneeded
chatter
and
discussions
that
mention
locations,
equipment
names,
communications problems, and unit morale.
4.
Cryptographic Security.
This deals with codes, keylists, and COMSEC
devices.
a. Using a security device denies enemy linguists the ability to
exploit message texts.
However, enemy EW units can still locate the
transmitter. They can associate the location and net structure to the type
unit, mission, and intentions.
b. When an enemy cannot gain information from a radio station, he may
try to jam or destroy it.
c. Codes and keylists should always be those included in the SOI.
Homemade codes offer no challenge to an experienced cryptoanalyst. However,
they do offer an excellent source of information.
They also provide
operators with a false sense of security.
d. Chattering causes communications compromise.
By talking around a
subject and using unauthorized nicknames, enemy analysts receive excellent
opportunities to gain EEFI.
5.
Physical Security.
Common sense measures and adherence to unit
operational policies are the keys to good physical security practices.
These include protection of SOI materials and keylists.
PART D - SUMMARY
1.
Preventive Measures.
a. The two major areas of
preventive
ECCM
are
systems design
and
operational techniques.
(1) Most military radios have unique design features incorporated
into their circuitry.
(a) Null steering
masks
the
pattern
to
degrade
the
effects of jamming.
(b) The spread spectrum technique suppresses interference by other
frequency users (friendly and enemy).
It provides multiple access (user
sharing) and ends multipath interference (self jamming).
2-13
SS0135
Previous Page
