(2) Deep operations are not new to warfare nor to the American Army. The concept of
interdicting the enemy's supplies, follow-on forces, reserves, and communications to impede his ability
to commit these at times and places of his choosing is a familiar feature of modem war. Our own
history (Word War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War) provides numerous examples of
successful (and unsuccessful) efforts to isolate the battlefield, paralyze the enemy's support and
command and control systems, and to prevent, delay, or disrupt the closure of uncommitted enemy
formations. The principal difference in such operations today is the increasing availability of means to
conduct them at the tactical, as well as the operational level.
(3) At both levels, the principal targets of deep operations are the freedom of action of the
opposing commander and the coherence and tempo of his operations. As with close operations, not all
activities focused forward of the line of contact are deep operations. Counterfire, for example, is
intended primarily to support the current fight, even though the target attacked in the counterfire effort
may be located at great distances from the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Similarly, electronic
warfare efforts to disrupt the enemy's control of engaged forces are part of close operations, even though
the targeted emitters may be well to the enemy's rear.
(4) Among the activities typically conducted as part of deep operations are:
Deception.
Deep surveillance and target acquisition.
Interdiction (by ground or air fires, ground or aerial maneuver, special operations
forces (SOF), or any combination of these).
Command, control, and communications countermeasures.
Command and control.
(5) Because of the relative scarcity of resources with which to perform these activities, deep
operations must be focused against those enemy capabilities which most directly threaten the success of
projected friendly operations. These must be attacked decisively, with enough power to assure the
desired impact. That will be the more true when, as will frequently be the case, seizure and retention of
the initiative depends on successful prosecution of deep operations.
c. Rear operations.
(1) Rear operations at any echelon comprise activities rearward of elements in contact and
are designed to assure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations,
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