including continuity of sustainment and command and control. Rear operations may have little
immediate impact on close ground operations, but are critical to subsequent operations, whether in
exploiting success or recouping failure. At the operational level, rear operations focus on preparing for
the next phase of the campaign or major operation. At the tactical level, rear operations underwrite the
tempo of combat, assuring the commander the agility to take advantage of any opportunity without
hesitation or delay.
(2) Four rearward activities in particular must be conducted as part of rear operations:
assembly and movement of reserves, redeployment of fire support, maintenance and protection of
sustainment effort, and maintenance of command and control. Reserves must be positioned to support
their anticipated commitment and secured from observation and attack. Probable deployment routes
must be free of obstruction, and the actual movement of reserves protected from enemy observation and
interdiction. Fire support assets likewise must be redeployed to support future operations, and that
must be secured against ground, air, and missile attack, and stocks to support projected operations
accumulated without decreasing the support to currently engaged units. Command posts and
communications networks must be deployed where they can continue the fight without a break in
(3) In addition to these critical activities, others relevant to rear operations include:
Traffic regulation and control.
Refugee control and maintenance of civil order.
(4) By themselves, none of these activities would normally have much impact on the current
battle. However, because it is precisely these activities which will be the targets of the enemy's deep
operations, their protection can easily begin to divert needed assets from the forward battle. To preclude
this, units involved in rear operations must be equipped and trained to protect themselves against all but
the mot serious threats, using both passive and active measures. Soldiers and leaders at all levels must
be alert to the rearward threat and be psychologically prepared to deal with it. Force commanders and
staffs must continually reevaluate the possibility of more serious threats to rear operations, and plan
measures to meet them with minimum penalty to on-going close operations.
4. Principles of War. Along with the tenets of ALB, the principles of war form a foundation for the
Army's fighting doctrine. The U.S. Army published its first set of principles of war in a 1921 training
regulation. The principles were in large measure drawn from the work of British Major General J.F.C.
Fuller, who developed a set of principles of